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In the eighteenth century, natural law thinkers tended to tread the narrow path between 
affirming Revelation at the cost of Reason on the one hand, and asserting Reason at the cost 
of Revelation on the other. When all has been said and done, to which body of divine writ will 
we have truly pledged our allegiance? Do we recognize Revelation or Reason, the Book of 
Books or the Book of Nature? Few eighteenth-century writers on natural law would have 
denied that both Scripture and Nature were books writ large by God for all mankind. Most 
were content to acknowledge truths derived by reason from nature without expressly denying 
the truths of faith contained in the Bible. Problems arose when truths of reason appeared to 
contradict truths of faith. In such cases, natural law thinkers—such as the Huguenot Jean 
Barbeyrac (1674-1744)—usually contended that what appeared to be truths of faith to 
previous generations were actually untruths. Consequently, truths of faith had to be subject to 
reinterpretation, and the guardians of religious truths would do well to devote some time to 
the study of natural law. Such contentions unavoidably brought men like Barbeyrac into 
conflict with clergymen as the keepers of the faith. Not surprisingly, eighteenth-century 
natural law thinkers often reveal a pronounced anticlerical streak. Because of his life-long 
devotion to natural law and moral philosophy, a moderate, Protestant anticlericalism also 
became second nature to Barbeyrac. This contribution examines Barbeyrac’s anticlerical 
reading of nature and natural law, which led to his critique of the Church Fathers. After a brief 
biographical outline, I shall focus on anticlerical tendencies in Barbeyrac’s writings, then 
discuss his appraisal of the moral philosophy of the Church Fathers, and finally assess 
Barbeyrac’s moral reading of nature. 
*** 
Jean Barbeyrac was born at Béziers in the Languedoc (southern France), on 15 March 1674, 
as the eldest son of Antoine Barbeyrac (d. 1690), a Huguenot minister of Provençal origin.1 
Jean was destined to follow his father’s example. In these years prior to the revocation of the 
Edict of Nantes, when the position of French Protestants was becoming increasingly 
precarious, Jean was sent to Montpellier to be educated by his uncle Charles Barbeyrac, a 
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physician of great repute. Following the revocation in 1685, Antoine Barbeyrac left France for 
Lausanne, leaving behind three of his four children, including Jean. A few months later, Jean 
Barbeyrac, now aged eleven, was able to escape to Switzerland via Lyon. 
 After studying Greek, Hebrew, philosophy and theology at Lausanne and Frankfurt an der 
Oder, Barbeyrac eventually settled in Berlin. He had preached for several years in the 
Walloon community in and around Berlin when the Elector of Brandenburg, Frederick III, in 
1697 appointed him at the Berlin Gymnasium as a teacher of ancient languages. Frustrated in 
his attempt to become a full minister of the French church—his supposed Socinian leanings 
thwarted what might have been an ecclesiastical career—he turned instead to the study of 
natural law. His 1706 translation of Samuel Pufendorf earned him a reputation as a law 
scholar of intellectual standing. In 1710, Barbeyrac returned to Lausanne to become professor 
of law and history. He received his doctorate in law only in 1717, when he exchanged the post 
in Lausanne for a professorship in public and private law at Groningen. He would teach law at 
Groningen University, whence he had been enticed by the offer of a substantial salary and a 
house in the middle of the town, for almost three decades. 
*** 
Barbeyrac’s thought should be interpreted in the light of his various experiences with 
religious intolerance, including (1) the oppression and persecution he underwent in France, 
(2) the hostility of his fellow Huguenots in Berlin, and, (3) in Lausanne, the demand of the 
reigning Swiss orthodoxy that clergymen and academics subscribe to the Formula Consensus 
(the Swiss ecclesiastical formularies of concord). Such experiences fuelled his interest in 
natural law and moral philosophy, his religious liberalism and anticlericalism, his call for 
freedom of conscience and his demand that church and clergy submit to secular political 
authority.2 
 Barbeyrac’s first work of international acclaim was an edited translation of Samuel 
Pufendorf’s Le droit de la nature & des gens, which appeared in two volumes in 1706 
(original Latin version 1672).3 Barbeyrac’s stylistic redrafting of the text, his painstaking 
verification of Pufendorf’s references to other works, and his own critical annotations, reveal 
his training both as a classicist and a jurist. Of particular importance is the fact that he 
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addressed himself specifically to a broad, francophone audience, who, as he said, had no 
access to proper handbooks of moral philosophy. Not an original thinker, and not given to 
synthesis, Barbeyrac owed his reputation in the eighteenth century to his considerable abilities 
as a translator and commentator of major writers on natural law and moral philosophy: 
Samuel Pufendorf, Hugo Grotius and Richard Cumberland. His work on natural law was, it 
seems, largely motivated by his desire to guarantee human liberty over and against arbitrary 
rule and to denounce a clergy prejudiced in favour of political and spiritual tyranny. 
Barbeyrac’s Protestant anticlericalism4 is evidenced in most of his writings. These include his 
translations of two academic orations by the Leiden law scholar Gerard Noodt; characteristic 
of Barbeyrac’s approach is that he appended a long, anticlerical footnote to Gerard Noodt’s 
Discours sur la liberté de conscience (1707).5 In the Traité du jeu (1709) he showed that, 
contrary to what orthodox divines asserted, games involving skill or chance were prohibited 
neither by Christian morality nor by natural law.6 His Discours sur l’utilité des lettres et des 
sciences, par rapport au bien de l’état, an oration held in Lausanne in 1714 at the end of his 
rectorate, lamented the tyranny that was the result of ignorance, especially ignorance in 
religious matters.7 
 Most revealing, perhaps, is the address Barbeyrac held in 1721, four years after his arrival 
in Groningen: De magistratu, forte peccante, e pulpitis sacris non traducendo.8 The address 
questioned the lawfulness of denouncing magistrates from the pulpit. Barbeyrac’s message 
was unmistakeable. No clergyman, he claimed, has the right to publicly criticize the 
magistracy for any reason whatsoever. A minister of the church has the same obligation as 
any other citizen. Public criticism of the magistracy leads to chaos and rebellion, all the more 
so when the critics are clergymen, who have a profound spiritual influence on the common 
people. Above all, Barbeyrac’s address amounted to a critique of what he considered the 
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clergy’s tendency to unlawfully establish their own independent jurisdiction. His address was 
a refutation of traditional Calvinist as well as Roman Catholic claims that the church, even if 
it was the ‘public’ or ‘dominant’ church, should be substantially independent of secular 
government. 
 Finally, there is the Traité de la morale des pères de l’Eglise (1728),9 a learned response to 
an equally erudite volume by a French Benedictine, Dom Rémi Ceillier (1688-1761). In his 
Apologie de la morale des pères de l’église, Ceillier had firmly rejected what he regarded as a 
cavalier treatment of the Church Fathers in Barbeyrac’s preface to Le droit de la nature & des 
gens.10 Barbeyrac’s general point in the Traité de la morale was twofold. Firstly, he pointed 
out that the Church Fathers from Clement of Alexandria to Gregory the Great had little to 
offer in the way of moral philosophy. Secondly, he argued that the arguments adduced by 
Ceillier in their defence were ‘fausses, foibles, ou forcées’, supported only by injury and 
invective larded with a veneer of courteous moderation and replete ‘de choses tout-à-fait hors 
d’oeuvre, de questions triviales, rebattuës, & dès-long tems épuisées’.11 The twelfth chapter of 
the Traité, on Gregory of Nazianz, which focused on the distinction between civil and 
ecclesiastical toleration, would embark on a bibliographical and intellectual career of its own. 
Translated into Dutch, it would be included in influential anthologies of texts, which also 
included Gerard Noodt’s Discours sur la liberté de conscience and John Locke’s Letter on 
Toleration.12 
*** 
Illustrative of Barbeyrac’s approach to nature and natural law is his 100-page preface to the 
enlarged, 1712 edition of his Pufendorf translation, Le droit de la nature & des gens. In this 
widely read preface, which would later elicit the praise of, among others, Voltaire, Barbeyrac 
contrasted ‘the speculative sciences’ with what he called the ‘science des moeurs’, or moral 
philosophy. While speculative sciences were unproductive and esoteric (Barbeyrac found an 
apt quotation to this effect in the Port-Royal Logic), the ‘science des moeurs’ was accessible 
to anybody willing to make proper use of his reason. In Barbeyrac’s view, the ‘science des 
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moeurs’ was a term applicable to the study of moral philosophy, natural law and politica. I 
shall simply use the term ‘moral philosophy’ in the following. 
 Moral philosophy, then, might be defined as a moral reading of nature. Barbeyrac contrasts 
this moral reading with a physical reading. There is no need, he writes, for every person to 
delve into the impenetrable secrets of nature, to uncover the imperceptible causes of 
phenomena and marvellous events, to measure the void between distant stars, or to dig into 
the hidden entrails of the earth. Nor is it necessary to read the books of men, to leaf through a 
large number of heavy tomes, to study many languages, to penetrate into the shadows of the 
past—in a word, to be an erudite scholar. On the contrary, all we need is to reflect a little on 
our own experience of life, on ourselves and on the objects that surround us. Such reflection 
will furnish even the simplest people with the general ideas of natural law and a reliable 
knowledge of basic human obligations.13 
 It is perfectly obvious, first, that human beings feel the need to regulate their conduct in 
order to achieve a measure of happiness; and, secondly, that God, as the creator and father of 
mankind, has given us the means to procure trustworthy knowledge of our obligations. 
Consequently, any human being must necessarily find it easy to discover the principles of 
moral philosophy. All men and women are capable of attaining a rudimentary understanding 
of morality by virtue of their Reason. If this applies to ‘people of the lowest order’, it will be 
evident that intelligent and cultured people (the gens de lettres) will be able to reach 
conclusions that are even more lucid.14 
 The larger part of Barbeyrac’s Préface is devoted to a brief history of the ‘science des 
moeurs’. His aim here is twofold. In the first place, Barbeyrac wants to offer a historical proof 
that man is able to, and at times actually does, come to an understanding of natural law solely 
through exercising his rational faculty. He demonstrates that laymen throughout the recorded 
history of mankind have attempted to develop such a rational moral philosophy. The 
examples he provides derive from ancient oriental cultures (the Chaldeans, the Egyptians, the 
Persians, the Indians and the Chinese), the ancient Greeks (including Thales, Plato, Aristotle 
and the Stoics) and the Romans (Cicero, Plutarch, Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Antonius). 
He concludes, however, that the study of moral philosophy only reached its apogee in the 
seventeenth century, in such writers as Hugo Grotius, John Selden and Samuel Pufendorf. 
Since time immemorial, laymen, both the philosophers of classical antiquity and modern 
thinkers such as Grotius and Pufendorf, have produced moral philosophy. With these lay 
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writers, who supplied so many valuable insights into moral philosophy, Barbeyrac contrasts 
the clergy. This points to the second aim of the Préface, an aim that was also the chief 
objective of the Traité de la morale. 
*** 
Official clergies, Barbeyrac points out in the Traité de la morale, have never been particularly 
keen on studying moral philosophy. The injunctions put forward by the ecclesiastics of all 
times have all too often reflected personal idiosyncrasies rather than sound moral philosophy. 
This applies to pagan priests, Jewish rabbis and the false doctors mentioned in the New 
Testament. It applies especially to the Church Fathers of the first six centuries A.D. 
(Athenagoras, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Origen, Cyprian, Lactantius, Athanasius, 
Cyril of Jerusalem, Basil, Gregory van Nazianz, Ambrose, Chrysostomus, Jerome, Augustine, 
Leo I and Gregory the Great), but also to their followers in the Roman Church. It pertains no 
less to the churchmen and theologians of the Reformation. Barbeyrac is true to his Protestant 
roots in that he ridicules Roman Catholic beliefs and traditions. He castigates Clement of 
Alexandria for holding that ‘the simplest pleasures, even those pertaining to marriage, are 
unjust, unreasonable and contrary to the law’. Clement regards natural delights as sinful in 
themselves, and believes that the permission to savour such delights is an indulgence granted 
by God only to avoid worse evils. Such ludicrous ideas have produced, among other things, 
the infamous vow of celibacy, which has led to so many difficulties, and which the self-styled 
head of the Roman church has imposed only to strengthen his own supremacy.15 Sexual 
passions have been created by the ‘Author of Nature himself’, contends Barbeyrac, and they 
are legitimate even when they do not contribute directly to reproduction. They need only to be 
regulated. It is to this end that nature, via the light of Reason, prescribes marriage laws; and 
these laws accord perfectly with the Bible (Hebr. 13:4).16 
 Barbeyrac was, however, no less concerned to rebuke the Protestant clergy. Illustrative in 
this respect is Chapter XII, where he discusses religious toleration. Force, he claims here, 
does not enlighten the mind, nor can it cause the mind to change its views. Yet, men are 
naturally prone to err, in spite of having access to supernatural revelation—if only because 
there are many mysteries still, things which God has deigned to reveal only in part. 
Consequently, each person must be free to believe and confess whatever he believes to be 
true. Whoever encroaches upon this freedom trespasses on divine right. Ecclesiastical powers 
may not be invested with the control over consciences. The civil authorities may protect a so-
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called dominant religion, but never propagate it by force.17 Barbeyrac generally contradicts 
Père Ceillier’s interpretation of Augustine and Gregory of Nazianz, demonstrating that these 
and other Church Fathers were inconsistent in the theory and practice of toleration. All that 
Ceillier is able to do, suffused as he is with clerical respect for patriarchal authority, is 
‘repeter hardiment les plus pitoiables raison dont les Persécuteurs se servent pour justifier leur 
barbarie’.18 In passing, Barbeyrac expresses his regret that there are still vestiges of 
intolerance among the Protestants.19 His attack on Ceillier and Roman Catholicism is a classic 
example of double-edged polemic. 
 In the Traité, Barbeyrac rails in particular against the frequent appeals made by Rémi 
Ceillier to the traditions and infallibility of the Roman Catholic Church. Barbeyrac’s criticism 
of Ceillier is partly rhetorical, in that he attempts from the outset to disqualify the method of 
his opponent. Ceillier, he suggests, has put so much emphasis on infallibility merely to 
preclude possible objections or disguise the many flaws in his arguments. The issue at stake, 
however, is not whether the Church Fathers are infallible or not. The real issue is whether 
their claims can stand the test of criticism; if whatever the Church Fathers assert is infallible, 
it must still hold up after rigorous rational scrutiny. In other words, it must be possible to 
convince even a heathen that the moral philosophy of the Church Fathers does, in fact, obtain. 
Ceillier can hardly deny that the law of nature has been ‘written in the hearts’ of heathens 
(Romans 2:15), and that they, too, possess the ability to explain matters according to ‘les 
régles du Bon-Sens & de la Critique’. In any satisfactory discussion on moral philosophy, the 
debaters must, therefore, be at liberty to reduce clerical contentions of whatever provenance 
or antiquity to evident ethical principles. A heathen may, however, even proceed further, and 
use his powers of reason to compare Ceillier’s interpretation of patristic moral injunctions 
with corresponding scriptural passages. Now suppose that the heathen discovers certain 
discrepancies between the Book of Books and the books of the Church Fathers. Ceillier will 
undoubtedly counter such criticism with the claim that the Bible is obscure and open to 
various readings, that the Church Fathers have provided posterity with the authoritative 
interpretation, and that we know their interpretation to be correct and authoritative because 
the Church says so; and the Church, of course, is infallible. At this stage of the debate the 
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heathen will undoubtedly throw up his hands in exasperation and demand that Dom Ceillier 
henceforth leave him be.20 
 Why did the Church Fathers produce such a manifestly dubious moral philosophy? 
Barbeyrac suggests several causes. Patristic writers were excessively attached to either purely 
speculative doctrine or ecclesiastical discipline. Insofar as they wrote on moral philosophy, 
they did so superficially and unsystematically, offering conclusions that were not derived 
from basic principles but from feeble or eccentric notions, and often from bizarre allegories. 
They had no interest in developing linguistic skills and neglected the rules of criticism, so that 
they vented awkward explanations of even the clearest biblical passages. They followed no 
proper order and method, and simply larded their discourses haphazardly with expository or 
ethical declarations. No wonder, then, that the Church Fathers fell into errors on issues that 
are quite evident to anybody who has adequately ‘penetrated into the true principles of moral 
thought’.21 
 In bringing the Church Fathers to trial before the court of Reason, Barbeyrac has a field 
day. Augustine’s arguments on property, he contends, are similar to, and just as specious as, 
the contentions of Thomas Hobbes. Both men believed that the principle of ‘mine and thine’ 
did not apply in the state of nature. It was a pity that Hobbes did not utilize Augustine’s 
impressive authority, since the latter’s mere approval would have made Hobbes’s writings 
palatable to everyone. Indeed, there are authors who have taken up the Augustinian-
Hobbesian argument, contending that property rights exist only in civil society, and that an 
absolute monarch is crucial to their maintenance. ‘Il n’y a que trop d’exemples, qui prouvent, 
combien les Ecclésiastiques de l’Eglise Romaine savent persuader aux Rois, qu’ils sont 
maîtres absolus & des Biens & des Vies de leurs Sujets; bien entendu qu’ils ne touchent point 
à ce qui regarde les Personnes & les Biens de ces mêmes Ecclésiastiques (…).’22 Barbeyrac is 
thinking of that other ecclesiastic, Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet. 
 The respect we owe to divine authority, claims Barbeyrac, implies that we use ‘la Droite 
Raison’, or ‘right reason’.23 Thus, in his view the contents of the Book of Nature are reflected 
in the contents of the Book of Scripture. Of those duties which the Bible commands us to 
observe, the larger part may be known solely by the light of Reason. Certainly, the Bible does 
provide much stronger incentives to do one’s duty than the motivations that Reason, left to 
itself, is able to determine. Nevertheless, by virtue of his reason alone, man is capable of 
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establishing general ethical principles; and by virtue of this ability, he is under the obligation 
to do so. Having ascertained general principles, moreover, man must proceed to establish also 
particular moral rules. This obligation to determine a sound—that is, a rational—moral 
philosophy applies especially to those who have been called to educate others. It therefore 
concerns, above all, ‘les Ministres Publics de la Religion’. Moral philosophy should be the 
chief study of all pastors, who must subsequently teach by word or in writing the results of 
their studies to the people. The question pondered by Barbeyrac in the Traité de la morale is 
whether the Church Fathers did, in fact, develop a reliable moral philosophy; and his answer 
is simply that, no, they did not.24 
 Take, by way of example, Saint Cyprian’s treatment of the following passage from the 
Lord’s sermon on the mount, concerning oaths: ‘Neither shalt thou swear by thy head, 
because thou canst not make one hair white or black’ (Matthew 5:36). Cyprian concludes 
from this that the female habit of using wigs and false hair is contrary to the moral law 
promulgated by Jesus. Ceillier, the apologist for the Church Fathers, observes sincerely 
enough that Cyprian’s account of the biblical text seems to express ingenuity more than it 
does solidity; but then, the Roman Catholic priest remarks, in moral philosophy it is not 
necessary that conclusions are drawn with metaphysical rigour. How so?, questions 
Barbeyrac. Cyprian’s method is based on neither Revelation nor Reason, and therefore 
untenable. Moreover, to suppose that the moral injunctions put forward in divinely inspired 
writings are more ingenious than solid is unworthy of an exegete. It would be better to simply 
admit that we do not fully understand the passage in question. Above all, it is beneath the 
dignity of a moral philosopher to abandon the ‘clear and simple’ precepts of the gospels and 
the arguments derived from nature by resorting to falsehood or the imagination—or, as 
Barbeyrac puts it, to quench one’s thirst from a filthy cistern rather than the pure source.25 
 To an eighteenth-century Protestant, the Church Fathers’ stubborn rejection of the purified 
contents of the Books of Nature and Scripture was conspicuous, to put it mildly. The register 
of the Traité de la morale offers a long catalogue of patriarchal flaws. The Fathers believed 
the Seventy who wrote the Septuaginta to have been divinely inspired. They considered the 
Old Testament to be replete with the notions of the cross and the crucifixion. Most accepted 
as true the corporality of angels and the fact that fallen angels had intercourse with women. 
They had no reservation in putting their faith in apocryphal writings. They allegorised 
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examples of dubious morality in the Bible, supposing that Holy Writ did not condemn such 
instances of bad conduct. They spurned remarriage, forbade intercourse with pregnant 
women, proscribed self-defence and outlawed usury.26 In the process, Barbeyrac casts doubt 
on the scholarship of such Catholic historians as Ceillier, Jean Baptiste Cotelier, Du Pin,  
Massuet, Denis Petau (Petavius), Jean Potter, Nicolas Rigault, Tillemont and the editors of the 
Mémoirs de Trevoux, and finds support in such Protestant authorities as Calvin, Jean Daillé 
and Daniel Whitby. Yet, in gauging their work on the Church Fathers, he also praises Pierre 
Daniel Huet, Fénelon and Montfaucon, and condemns Hugo Grotius and Pierre Jurieu. 
Throughout, Barbeyrac sets great store by critical scholarship, attempting to win the respect of 
the Lutheran churchman Johann Franz Budde (whom he regards ‘comme un Savant 
Théologien, &, ce qui est bien plus estimable, comme un Théologien moderé’),27 who had 
expressed some disagreement with Barbeyrac in his Isagoge historico-theologica. As for 
Barbeyrac himself, he generally associated the Church Fathers with unreasonableness, lack of 
judgement, unfairness, harshness, credulity, susceptibility to the imagination, and an 
inordinate liking for allegory, leading to ideas that were more often than not ‘vagues, 
confuses, superficielles, mal liées, outrées’. This he contrasts with a critical and reasonable 
approach to Nature and Scripture, with the exercise of the ‘lumières de la Raison’ or the 
‘principes généraux de cette Loi Naturelle, qui est gravée dans le coeur de tous les 
Hommes’,28 the results of which activity should be put down in a plain but elegant style. 
*** 
How to assess Barbeyrac’s moral reading of the Book of Nature? Barbeyrac was more than 
just an anticlerical thinker, of course, and his anticlericalism is moderate enough. If Barbeyrac 
opposed, above all, the arbitrary exercise of power in the church as well as the state, he 
certainly did not wish to dispense with the spiritual services afforded by an established clergy. 
He believed that a prince or magistracy ought to be concerned primarily with the welfare of 
the commonwealth and the well being of its individual members. This implied that the civil 
authorities were to guarantee freedom of conscience, which in turn required that the church 
and the clergy should be subjected unequivocally to the authority of the state. In the Préface 
and the Traité de la morale des Pères, Barbeyrac attempted to demonstrate, first, that there is 
no call to respect the moral authority of the clergy in general, and the Church Fathers in 
particular, since their moral philosophy is shoddy and arbitrary. Secondly, he argued that 
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moral rules ought to be derived from Scripture and Reason and not from dubious claims to 
authority or even infallibility. If God is the ‘Author of Nature’, he is also the author of 
Scripture; and the one cannot contradict the other. Barbeyrac, then, juxtaposed Reason and 
Revelation. The end result is that, for him, the nature has become normative in all matters 
unrelated to speculative doctrine, and that it must be read closely in order to achieve an 
equitable society. 
 Barbeyrac was a writer of substantial influence.29 He owed his popularity to his use of the 
French language and to his rich commentaries, but also to his simple juxtaposition of Reason 
and Revelation; the way he did so can hardly be qualified as outrageous in the context of 
eighteenth-century Protestant thought. However, quite radical conclusions might be drawn 
from the way he utilized critical historical scholarship to undermine clerical and ecclesiastical 
tradition, and the way he employed Reason as a means to set the Books of Bible and Nature 
on what to all appearances was an equal footing. It seems that Barbeyrac’s thought may be 
interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, he was instrumental in disseminating the thought of 
John Locke and Gerard Noodt to a wider audience, and in popularising the study of natural 
law. Through his legal commentaries, his urgent appeal to the Book of Nature as a book of 
rational and equitable morality reached audiences ranging from Paris to the distant American 
colonies. On the other hand, it is perfectly possible to interpret Barbeyrac’s thought on 
politics and religion, and on the relations between the two, as inconsistent in its elitism. One 
of Barbeyrac’s main contributions to the philosophy of his day was an in-depth theory of the 
individual conscience.30 Drawing partly on the moral epistemology of John Locke, and 
specifically rejecting the Pyrrhonism (i.e. the scepticism) of Pierre Bayle, Barbeyrac tended to 
conflate the self-sufficient and independent human conscience on the one hand with Reason 
on the other. According to Barbeyrac, moral concepts are available to each man’s rational 
conscience. Apparently he failed to fully acknowledge the logical outcome of his theory, let 
alone to offer a solution to the problems it posed. Leibniz, in his critique of Pufendorf, had 
pointed out two difficulties. In the first place, the Pufendorf-Barbeyrac line of thought 
ultimately led to the subordination of God’s authority to that of human reason. In the second 
place, Barbeyrac’s emphasis on the individual conscience and the right of resistance to 
                                                     
29
 Roman Catholic apologists recognized him as an important adversary; cf. Kathleen Hardesty Doig, ‘The Abbé 
Nicolas-Sylvestre Bergier and the History of Heresy’, in: John Christian Laursen ed., Histories of Heresy in 
Early Modern Europe. For, Against, and Beyond Persecution and Toleration (New York, Basingstoke, 2002), 
pp. 263-280. 
30
 For the following, see T.J. Hochstrasser, ‘The Claims of Conscience: Natural Law Theory, Obligation, and 
Resistance in the Huguenot Diaspora’, in:  John Christian Laursen, ed., New Essays on the Political Thought of 
the Huguenots of the Réfuge (Leiden etc., 1995), pp. 15-51. 
 12
tyranny implied an acknowledgement of the ability of men from all social stations to take 
political action. Barbeyrac’s ambiguous position on both issues is illustrated by his somewhat 
inconclusive response to Leibniz, which was included as the Jugement d’un Anonyme in the 
third edition of Pufendorf’s Devoirs de l’homme. Admitting that obligation derives ultimately 
from the will of God, Barbeyrac restricted the right of resistance to the political elite. 
Incidentally, he was not much enamoured of Leibniz, whom he had known in Berlin, and 
whom he considered to be jealous, domineering and irritable. In any case, Barbeyrac did not, 
and was probably both unwilling and unable to, solve the two ambiguities in his thought on 
conscience and Reason. 
 As an anticlerical protégé of the Groningen magistracy, Barbeyrac restricted the right to 
resistance to tyranny to the political leadership, while he did not dispute the idea of a 
dominant or public religion. He shared this inclination to support the political elite, and to 
maintain a latitudinarian ecclesiastical establishment, with the Dutch republican tradition as it 
had evolved from Grotius to Noodt.31 As a latitudinarian Huguenot, dependant on the 
goodwill of foreign masters, Barbeyrac retained the will of God to prevent the moral and 
political order from losing its moorings in the divine order. At the same time, he strongly 
emphasized the liberty of conscience over ecclesiastical tyranny, as well as Reason over 
religious tradition. Barbeyrac’s philosophy of natural law may be construed as a defence of 
the political and religious status quo of the Dutch (or, for that matter, Genevan) Republic.32 
On the other hand, it would only be fair to point out that his anticlerical reading of the Book 
of Nature served as an important catalyst in eighteenth-century debates on religious liberty 
and toleration. 
 
Abstract 
In his Traité de la morale des peres de l’Eglise (1728), the French-German-Dutch Huguenot 
Jean Barbeyrac (1674-1744) responded at length to critical reflections previously made by the 
French Benedictine Dom Rémi Ceillier (1688-1761) in the Apologie de la morale des pères 
de l'église (1718). Ceillier had made exception to what he regarded as the cavalier treatment 
of the Church Fathers in Barbeyrac’s translation of Pufendorf’s Le droit de la nature & des 
gens. Barbeyrac put forward his objections in the Traité de la morale, pointing out that the 
moral philosophy of the major patristic writers was both unbiblical and unreasonable. He 
assessed the Church Fathers’ moral philosophy by judging it against both nature and the Bible 
as the two authoritative sources of moral knowledge. Barbeyrac juxtaposed Reason and 
Revelation, arguing that nature is normative in all matters unrelated to speculative doctrine. 
His historical scholarship and his views of nature implicitly seem to lead to quite radical 
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interpretations, including a deist view of the Christian revelation and an affirmation of 
absolute political equality. Barbeyrac’s own thought, however, does not appear to be free 
from religious and political ambiguities. The source of these ambiguities may well be his 
somewhat delicate position as a Hugenot refugee dependent on the support of foreign masters. 
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